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The risk in mortgages has been investigated by academicians 
and practitioners for decades. While the development of our 
understanding of the risk in commercial mortgages has paralleled that 
of the residential mortgage research, it lagged by 10-20 years and has 
some different emphases.1 Unlike recent studies on residential 
mortgages that primarily focus on prepayment risk,2 the research on 
commercial mortgages concentrates on default risk because 
commercial mortgages are generally nonrecourse and have 
prepayment protection in the form of lockouts, defeasance, or yield 
maintenance agreements.  
Commercial mortgage default risk has been examined from a 
variety of perspectives. Some studies examine the performance of 
commercial mortgages with loan-level data (Snyderman [1991, 1994]; 
Ciochetti [1997]; Esaki, L'Heureux, and Snyderman [1999]);3 others 
investigate the probability of default using statistical models (Vandell 
[1992]; Vandell et al. [1993]).4 Researchers have also analyzed the 
pricing of commercial mortgages in a contingent-claims framework 
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(Titman and Torons [1989]; Kau et al. [1990]; Childs, Ott, and 
Riddiough [1996]).5 These studies focus on the risk that the borrower 
may default before the loan matures but generally pay little attention 
to the possibility that a borrower may have difficulty paying off the 
loan at maturity even though the loan is not in default.6  
Unlike residential mortgages, most of which are fully amortizing 
loans, commercial mortgages often are interest-only or amortizing 
loans with a balloon payment at maturity. This balloon payment is 
usually made by refinancing the current mortgage and the extension 
risk (also referred to as balloon risk or refinance risk) arises from the 
borrower's inability to refinance at mortgage maturity. Borrowers with 
a mortgage at maturity that is not in default but does not meet 
contemporaneous underwriting standards will often request to extend 
the loan with the lender (see Harding and Sirmans [1997]; Jacob and 
Fastovsky [1999]). The borrower's ability to refinance a mortgage is 
largely dependent on changes in four factors between mortgage 
origination and loan maturity: mortgage interest rate, property net 
operating income (NOI), debt coverage ratio (DCR), and loan-to-value 
ratio (LTVR).  
The inability of a borrower to refinance a mortgage can lead to 
extension and ultimately default. Lenders and mortgage service 
companies often agree to extend a mortgage only after establishing a 
new set of standards for the repayment of principal and interest; some 
of these include: assigning property income to a lock box, hyper-
amortization, payment of mortgage extension points, higher interest 
rates, and floating interest rates, among others. While many extended 
loans are eventually worked out with no direct loss (and possibly a 
gain) to the lender, other extended loans fail.  
In this article we use both historical data and Monte Carlo 
simulation to examine the likelihood of loan extension and potential 
losses associated with extension. We find that extension probability is 
highly sensitive to property NOI growth, to NOI volatility, to the 
amortization schedule, and to the loan term. We also find that 
extension risk is largely unaffected by changing credit spreads, 
changing yield curve assumptions, and changing term default 
assumptions.7 We also find that changing the underwriting standards 
(i.e., tighter or looser DCR and LTVR ratios) affects the probability of 
loan extension; however, in a somewhat muted way. Finally, we 
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estimate that the loss during extension is approximately 2%-3% of the 
outstanding loan amount at maturity.  
The remainder of the article is segmented into four additional 
sections. In the next section we discuss extension risk using historical 
data. Using data from the American Council of Life Insurance (ACLl), 
we assess the likelihood of loan extension across a variety of property 
income growth rates and property types. In the section that follows we 
estimate the probability that a loan will be extended using Monte Carlo 
simulation. With Monte Carlo simulation we are able to control for a 
variety of factors that are not accounted for when using historical data 
including default, NOI volatility, and interest rate volatility. With 
reasonable estimates of mortgage extension rates, we measure 
extension loss in the next to last section and close the article with the 
conclusion.  
 
Extension Risk Using Historical Information  
We first examine a borrower's ability to refinance a mortgage at 
maturity using data on commercial mortgages compiled by the 
American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI).8 There are two primary 
lender ratios that are used by permanent lenders to measure risk in 
commercial mortgages—debt coverage ratio and loan-to-value ratio. 
While lenders also assess borrower credit history and asset quality, the 
riskiness of commercial mortgages is primarily based on the ability of 
the asset to generate sufficient cash flow to make periodic mortgage 
payments (return on investment) and the expected asset value at loan 
maturity to repay principal (return of investment).  
The debt coverage ratio measures how many times property 
income covers debt service. In other words, DCR is a cash flow 
adequacy test. To determine the justified loan amount based on 
property cash flows, we calculate the following:  
 
 
 
In this equation NOI divided by DCR reveals the justified debt 
service amount. Dividing the justified debt service amount by the 
mortgage constant (MC) returns the justified loan amount. The 
mortgage constant is the installment to amortize a dollar for 
amortizing loans and the mortgage interest rate for interest-only 
loans.  
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In addition to determining a justified loan amount based on 
property cash flows, lenders also determine a justified loan amount 
based on the collateral value of the asset: 
 
 
 
Dividing the NOI by the capitalization rate (CR) returns an asset 
value, which is then multiplied by the loan-to-value ratio to arrive at 
the justified loan amount based on property value. If the requested 
loan amount is less than or equal to the lesser of the JLADCR and JLALTVR 
the borrower has a good credit history, and the asset is of sufficient 
quality, the loan is made.  
Moving forward in time to loan maturity, if the property has 
been reasonably well maintained and the borrower remains in good 
standing, the loan is likely to be refinanced if both the 
contemporaneous JLADCR and JLALTVR are greater than or equal to the 
outstanding loan balance at maturity (OLBM, which is also the balloon 
payment). Using the ACLI data on mortgage interest rates, 
capitalization rates, debt coverage ratios, and loan-to-value ratios, we 
measure the likelihood that the borrower would be unable to refinance 
the loan at maturity.  
The ACLI data for the period 1966 to 1998 is summarized in 
Exhibit 1. The average interest rate across the three property types 
(office, retail, and industrial) on commercial loans was approximately 
9.7%, with interest rates varying widely from just over 6% to just 
under 16%. Capitalization rates were approximately 10% with a 
standard deviation of about 1%, about one-half the variability of 
mortgage interest rates. The two primary loan-underwriting standards, 
DCR and LTVR, show little variance around their mean values of 1.3 
times income and 71 % of value.  
To estimate whether an average loan would be extended we use 
the loan underwriting standards and interest rates reported at 
mortgage origination and compare them to the standards and rates at 
mortgage maturity as follows:9  
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Extension risk is therefore a function of the justified loan 
amount when the loan is refinanced (JLAM) and the outstanding loan 
balance at maturity (i.e., balloon payment). It should be noted that 
this measure of extension risk does not imply that the value of the 
property is not adequate to pay off the loan at maturity. What is 
suggested is that using underwriting standards at loan maturity, the 
outstanding balance exceeds what can be justified to refinance the 
outstanding loan balance.  
Panel A of Exhibit 2 presents the results of estimating extension 
risk of five-year mortgages using the underwriting standards set forth 
in Equations (1) and (2). The extension risk is based on rolling five-
year periods beginning 1966:1 and running through 1998:3. For each 
of 111 five-year periods (1966:1 to 1970:4, 1966:2 to 1971:1, and so 
on) we determine whether the outstanding loan balance of a mortgage 
originated five years earlier can be underwritten based on 
contemporaneous interest rates, cap rates, LTVRs, and DCRs given a 
certain NOI growth rate. The exhibit presents the frequency of loan 
extension for both interest-only and 30-year amortizing loans with a 
balloon at the end of a five-year loan term.10  
The results reveal that across all property types and income 
growth rates, the extension potential approximately doubles from a 
30-year amortizing loan with a five-year balloon payment to an 
interest-only (i.e., five-year bullet) loan, all else equal. For example, 
assuming a 30-year amortizing mortgage on an office property with a 
3% NOI growth rate, 9.0% of the time (10 out of 111) income growth 
is not adequate to offset an increase in interest rates or a change in 
underwriting standards five years later; 18.9% of the time (21 out of 
111) an interest-only loan would be subject to extension risk. These 
loans may not be underwater (i.e., the outstanding loan amount is 
greater than the property value); however, either the property income 
or property value is not adequate to refinance the outstanding loan 
amount at maturity. As expected, when property income growth rates 
increase extension risk drops in a geometric pattern across both 
amortizing and interest-only loans.  
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Panel B of Exhibit 2 presents the extension risk for 10-year 
mortgages. The results are similar to Panel A; however, the extension 
risk differentials are even greater between amortizing and interest-
only loans. These results indicate that amortizing loans are much less 
likely to run the risk of being extended. While amortizing loans are 
expected to have a lower extension risk, the magnitude of the 
difference was not expected. Additionally, longer-term loans have 
lower extension risk than shorter-term loans. Greater loan 
amortization and the upward drift of NOI may explain lower extension 
risk for longer-term loans.  
While the results presented in Exhibit 2 are interesting and 
informative, there are some limitations to these findings. The results 
are based on aggregate data, not loan-specific data. Also, it is 
assumed that all originated loans survive to maturity, i.e., there is no 
default or prepayment before maturity. Additionally, the analysis does 
not consider NOI volatility. In the next section we use the Monte Carlo 
simulation to measure the extension risk of individual loans while 
explicitly accounting for interest rate volatility, NOI volatility, and term 
default.  
 
Extension Risk Using the Monte Carlo Simulation  
To more accurately assess extension risk, it is necessary to first 
estimate the probability that the mortgage has been terminated prior 
to maturity. In other words, loans that default during the term of the 
loan are no longer outstanding at maturity and therefore have no 
possibility of being extended. To measure extension risk while 
accounting for the possibility of term default, we employ the 
framework developed by Titman and Torous [1989] and Kau et al. 
[1990], whereby the borrower chooses to exercise the default option if 
the property value falls below the market value of the mortgage at any 
payment date.  
Two stochastic state variable—property NOI and interest rates—
are included in the model. We assume that NOI follows a standard 
lognormal diffusion process,11 and that interest rates follow the mean-
reverting, square root model of Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross [1985].12 
Property values are determined by direct capitalization where value is 
equal to NOI divided by capitalization rate (CR), V = NOI/CR. Historical 
data shows that capitalization rates are correlated with mortgage 
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interest rates; we therefore estimate contemporaneous cap rates as a 
function of mortgage interest rates.13  
Following other studies on commercial mortgages (e.g., Titman 
and Torous [1989]; Childs, Ott, and Riddiough [1996]), we assume 
that all mortgages are nonrecourse and that prepayment will not occur 
due to defeasance, lock-out, and yield maintenance provisions. The 
base-case simulation uses an upward-sloping Treasury yield curve,14 
and the credit risk spread on 10-year mortgages is assumed to be 180 
basis points over similarly termed Treasuries.15  
Since only mortgages that survive to maturity are subject to 
extension risk, an important step in the analysis is to establish the 
borrower's default decision criteria. Early commercial mortgage pricing 
research assumes that borrowers default ruthlessly (i.e., the borrower 
defaults when the property value falls below the mortgage value). 
Subsequent evidence shows that transaction costs for both borrowers 
and lenders are relevant to an appropriately specified model.16 We 
therefore assume that if the property value is 5% less than the market 
value of mortgage the borrower will default. Panel A of Exhibit 3 
presents the timing of term default for the base case analysis where 
we assume a 3% property NOI growth rate and a 12% NOI standard 
deviation. Both the timing and cumulative default rates (10.46%) are 
consistent with Esaki, L'Heureux, and Snyderman [1999]. Panel B of 
the exhibit shows the distribution of loan-to-value-ratio at the end of 
year 10 for a mortgage that does not default before maturity. The 
distribution reveals that a mortgage has a 76.66% chance of being 
refinanced, and a 12.88% chance of being extended.  
Exhibit 4 reveals the cumulative default levels and extension 
risk levels for 10-year mortgages with 30-year amortizations for a 
range of NOI growth rates and NOI growth volatilities.17 NOI growth 
rates range from 1% to 5%, which reflects investor and lender 
expectations over the past 15 years. The NOI standard deviation range 
is from 6% to 18%.18 At origination the loan is expected to be 
underwritten using a 1.3 DCR and a 75% LTVR; the same standards 
are used to underwrite the loan at refinancing.  
Cumulative default rates in Exhibit 4 range from a 0.0% for the 
5% NOI growth and 6% NOI standard deviation case to 40.90% for 
the 1% NOI growth and 18% NOI standard deviation case. As 
expected default rates increase monotonically as the volatility of NOI 
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increases and decrease monotonically as expected NOI growth 
increases. However, the pattern of extension risk is less clear.  
Extension risk in Panel B of Exhibit 4 generally reveals a 
decreasing pattern for the 1% NOI growth rate case as the standard 
deviation increases, while the 3% and 5% growth rate cases reveal an 
increasing pattern of extension risk that is increasing at a decreasing 
rate. One possible explanation for this anomaly is the high probability 
of term default tor the 1% NOI growth rate case, which significantly 
reduces the chance of loans remaining till maturity to be extended. For 
the 3% and 5% NOI growth cases, the high probability of term default 
may also explain why extension risk largely stabilizes, or even 
declines, after the 12% NOI standard deviation cases.  
Exhibit 5 shows the simulation results for 10-year, interest-only 
mortgages. The extension risk reveals similar patterns across NOI 
growth and volatility. Interestingly, extension risk is much higher for 
the non-amortizing loans than the 30-year amortizing loans when NOI 
standard deviation is relatively low, but becomes comparable to 
Exhibit 4 across amortization schedules when NOI is more volatile.  
Exhibit 6 presents the results for the base case analysis (3% NOI 
growth, 12% NOI standard deviation, and 30-year amortization) where 
underwriting standards at maturity are allowed to differ from those at 
loan origination. Across reasonable changes in underwriting standards 
the risk of extension remains relatively stable; however, as 
underwriting standards are taken to relative extremes, extension risk 
changes become more volatile.  
Additional simulations were completed where the following 
variables were permitted to change: credit risk spreads, the term 
structure of interest rates, and the correlation between NOI and 
interest rates. For each of these simulations we find the extension risk 
to be largely unaffected over reasonable changes in these attributes.  
 
Extension Loss  
With an understanding of the effect of changing interest rates, 
underwriting standards, and property income growth rates and 
volatilities on the probability of mortgage extension, we now estimate 
lender's expected loss on an extended loan. Extension loss comes from 
two factors: 1) delays in receiving cash flows from extended 
mortgages, and 2) mortgage default during extension.  
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By definition, extended loans are riskier than loans that can be 
refinanced. As such, cash flows from extended loans need to be 
discounted at a rate that reflects the increase in yield necessary to 
offset the quality shrinkage. Therefore, the discount rate to take the 
present value of the mortgage cash flows (back to the mortgage 
maturity date) should exceed mortgage interest rate at maturity to 
account for the uncertainty and illiquidity that comes with investing in 
extended loans.  
Default during extension is another risk that must be addressed. 
We assume that during the extension period 1) loans with a DCR of 
greater than 1.30 and a LTVR of less than 75% will be refinanced; 2) 
default will occur when property values fall below 95% of the 
mortgage value after year 10 (the same assumption used to model 
term default) and defaulted mortgages are assumed to incur a loss of 
35% of the outstanding loan balance;19 and 3) loans that are not 
refinanced and not in default will be extended for another one-year 
period. 
Exhibit 7 presents default, extension, and refinance rates 
assuming a 3% NOI growth rate. Assuming each loan can be extended 
for as many as 10 consecutive years, we analyze mortgage extension 
through year 20.20 The first column of the exhibit presents the 
probability that a loan has defaulted before maturity, that it can be 
refinanced, and that it needs to be extended. For example, using the 
12% NOI standard deviation case in Exhibit 7, the simulation results 
reveal a 10.46% term default rate, 76.66% refinance rate, and 
12.88% extension rate.  
For the 12% standard deviation case (where 12.88% of the 
loans are extended) subsequent default, refinance, and extension are 
simulated for each year after the original maturity. For instance, in 
year 11, of the extended loans 0.66% default, 4.14% are refinanced, 
and 8.08% are extended again.21 This process is continued each year 
till year 20 when all remaining loans are refinanced. Within five years 
of maturity, less than 1 % of all loans continue to be extended across 
all simulated levels of NOT variance. In the first year of mortgage 
extension (year 11), as NOI standard deviation increases from 6% to 
15% default rates increase dramatically from 0.04% to 1.08%, but the 
rate of default levels off for the 18% NOI standard deviation case. The 
change in default rates across NOI standard deviations becomes much 
more muted in subsequent years, and after the fifth year of extension 
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(year 15) default and extension rates become negligible across all 
levels of NOI variance.  
The large increase in default levels across increasing NOI 
variance creates significantly higher loss rates for higher NOI standard 
deviations as can be seen in Exhibit 8. In the exhibit loan losses are 
stated as a percentage of the outstanding loan balance at maturity. 
Since little empirical evidence exists on the appropriate cash flow 
discount rate we present a range of risk premiums over 
contemporaneous mortgage interest rates. The results reveal that the 
6% NOI standard deviation case has an expected loss that is half of 
the 12%-18% standard deviation cases. Interestingly, expected loss 
rates for the 12%-18% NOI standard deviation cases when using a 
100-600 basis point risk premium over contemporaneous mortgage 
interest rates are remarkably stable at approximately 2%-3% of the 
outstanding loan balance at maturity.  
 
Conclusion  
Extension risk in commercial mortgages arises from the 
borrower's inability to refinance a property at maturity. The risk of a 
loan extending primarily comes from adverse changes in the loan-to-
value ratio, the debt coverage ratio, the property's net operating 
income, and/ or interest rates. While a loan may run the risk of 
extension, extended loans may not create losses. Most loans that are 
extended have stepped-up amortization schedules, mortgage 
extension points, and interest rate adjustments.  
In this article we use both historical data and Monte Carlo 
simulation to assess the probability that a borrower is unable to 
refinance the mortgage at maturity. As expected, we find that 
extension risk is sensitive to NOI drift and mortgage amortization: 
properties with lower NOI growth are more likely to experience 
difficulty refinancing; and interest-only loans are subject to higher 
extension risk than amortizing loans. While NOI volatility has a 
dramatic effect on term default risk, reasonable ranges of NOI 
volatility have a muted effect on extension risk. One potential reason 
for the minor impact of NOI volatility on extension risk may be 
attributable to the interaction of default and extension (i.e., a 
defaulted loan is no longer outstanding at maturity and therefore 
cannot be extended).  
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Other potential factors in predicting extension risk are the 
underwriting standards at maturity. As expected, tighter standards at 
maturity, as opposed to loan origination, increase extension risk. 
Ho\\'ever, the results are somewhat surprising when the same 
underwriting standards are used at loan maturity and loan origination. 
While the tighter underwriting requirements at origination substantially 
reduce the probability of default during the life of a loan, they increase 
the possibility of extension. Again, this result may be attributable to 
the interaction between default and extension.  
For all loans that cannot be refinanced at maturity we continue 
the simulation for 10 more years. There the extended mortgages are 
refinanced as soon as underwriting standards are met. By year 15 we 
find that less than 1 % of all mortgages continue to be extended 
across all models of NOI variance. Using a range of discount rates we 
find that expected losses from extension are relatively stable at 2%-
3% of the original loan amount at loan origination.  
To date, extension risk has largely been overlooked in the 
literature, and possibly over (under) estimated by mortgage lenders 
due to the uncertainty (ignorance) of losses during extension. This 
article is a first cut at understanding extension risk and we find that 
this risk is not trivial, but may be less than some might expect.  
 
Endnotes  
1. For a comprehensive review of the early literature on mortgage credit risk, 
see Vandell [1993].  
2. Residential mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are generally guaranteed by 
government-sponsored agencies, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
effectively eliminating the default risk tor MBS investors.  
3. Snyderman [1991, 1994] and Esaki, L'Heureux, and Snyderman [1999] 
examine cumulative default risk and loss severity of commercial 
mortgages made by insurance companies. The results indicate that 
investor; in commercial mortgages generally cam more yield than 
Treasury securities but overall performance of these loans was 
extremely volatile. Ciochetti [1997] describes the loss characteristics 
associated with commercial mortgage foreclosure and finds that the 
average net loss recovery was approximately 69% and this amount is 
related to loan size, geographical location, and, most importantly, the 
jurisdictional foreclosure method.  
4. Vandell [1992] and Vandell et al. [1993] use statistical models to evaluate 
the relationship between commercial mortgage default and loan, 
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borrower, property, and market characteristics. The results confirm 
that property value and market value of the mortgage are the 
dominant factors affecting default.  
5. Titman and Torous [1989] are the first to use contingent claims modeling 
in commercial mortgage pricing. They find that the model can explain 
the observed default premiums for a sample of fixed-rate, bullet 
mortgages. Kau et al. [1990] model the pricing of commercial 
mortgages and their mortgage-backed securities. In their analysis, the 
valuation of an MBS is explicitly tied to that of the underlying 
mortgage. The authors conclude that option-pricing models provide an 
accurate and flexible approach to valuing MBS. Childs, Ott, and 
Riddiough [1996] apply the contingent-claim model to the pricing of 
multi-class commercial mortgage-backed securities.  
6. For a discussion of reasons why defaults will tend to be delayed, and thus 
balloon risk will become more significant, see Corcoran [2000].  
7. Term default is defined as borrower default during the term of the loan and 
is exclusive of default during the extension period.  
8. The data reported by the ACLI are quarterly averages by property type. No 
loan-specific data is provided. ACLI reporting companies account for 
approximately two-thirds of non-farm mortgages held in the U.S. by 
life insurance companies. The data in this report is from the ACLI's 
Investment Bulletin.  
9. In the analysis it is assumed that there are no defaults or prepayments 
before loan maturity.  
10. Given a 1% NOI annual growth, for example, an office mortgage with 30-
year amortization would not be refinanced at maturity in 27 of the 111 
rolling five-year periods (24.3%) as either the LTVR is too high or the 
DCR is too low to underwrite based on the contemporaneous 
standards. Although this analysis approach is sometimes called 
“historic simulation,” it involves only mechanical computations with 
historical data, but no random variables.  
11. It is assumed that the net operating income of a property follows the 
lognormal process:  
 
Where 
γ ≡ instantaneous expected growth rate of NOI 
δNOI ≡ instantaneous standard deviastion of NOI growth. 
z ≡ standardized Wiener process. 
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12. In the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model, instantaneous risk-free rate is assumed 
to follow the stochastic process:  
  
where  
 
Additionally, unanticipated changes in NOI growth are assumed to be 
correlated with unanticipated changes in interest rates, dzNOIdzr = pdt, 
where p denotes the correlation coefficient. A 0.2 correlation is used in 
the analysis.  
 
13. The relationship between capitalization rates and mortgage rates is 
estimated with data from the American Council of Life Insurance 
(ACLI) for the period 1996 to 1998, using the following regression 
model:  
 
Capitalization Rate = a + b x Mortgage Rate + δCAPdz 
 
where a and b are the intercept and slope of the regression line.  
 
14. In the model, , , and r, are 10%, 7.5%, and 8%, respectively. These 
parameters are consistent with studies by Riddiough and Thompson 
[1993] and Childs, Ott, and Riddiough [1996]. A 6% short-term risk-
free rate is assumed. Other shapes of the yield curve and parameters 
used in Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross [1979]. Dunn and McConnell [1981], 
Kau, Keenan, and Kim [1994], and Hilliard, Kau, and Slawson [1998] 
are also considered, but do not significantly affect the results.  
15. The average spread between commercial mortgages and U.S. Treasuries 
from 1966 to 1998 was 167 basis points; the average spread in the 
last 10 years was 187 basis points. We run the simulation with spreads 
of 160, 170, 180, 190, and 200 basis points, and find similar results.  
16. Borrower default cost has been treated in a variety of ways. For example, 
Ciochetti and Vandell [1999] consider the borrower default cost as a 
constant percentage of property value. Riddiough and Thompson 
[1993] model the costs as a function of loan characteristics.  
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17. At the beginning of the simulation process, it is assumed that mortgage 
interest rate is 8.03% and the property NOI is $1,000 (which is 
arbitrarily selected and has no effects on the results). In each 
simulation path, the interest rate, NOI growth rate, and capitalization 
rate are generated by computer based on the specified stochastic 
processes. With the simulated parameters, mortgage value and 
property value are calculated for each of the following time periods. In 
each period, if the property value is less than 95% of the mortgage 
value, we assume that the borrower defaults so the simulation path is 
terminated. In a path where the borrower docs not default prior to 
maturity, a justified loan amount is calculated based on the LTVR and 
DCR at maturity, the contemporaneous mortgage rate, and the 
property NOI at the time of refinancing. If the justified loan amount is 
greater than the outstanding loan balance at maturity, the mortgage is 
refinanced; otherwise, it needs to be extended. Loan extension is 
represented by a binary variable (which has a value of 1 if the loan is 
extended. and 0 otherwise). Extension risk in the following exhibits is 
the mean value of this binary variable using 5,000 simulation 
iterations.  
 
18. Jacob, Hong, and Lee [1999] estimate a 6% volatility of NOI with large 
and diversified pool of properties and expect the volatility of individual 
properties to range between 9% and 15%. Meanwhile, Ciochetti and 
Vandell [1999] and Geitner, Craff, and Young [1994] suggest an 
implied annual volatility of property value of 14%-18%. We therefore 
consider the range between 6% and 18% for the simulation analysis.  
19. See Curry, Blalock, and Cole [1991], Snyderman [1994], and Ciochetti 
[1997] for discussion of loss severity associated with commercial 
mortgage foreclosure. It could be argued that a risk-adjusted discount 
rate already accounts for default losses. Here we model extension 
default separately and suggest that increases in the discount rate are 
attributable to the uncertainty of the timing of the cash flows and lack 
of investment liquidity.  
20. All loans extended for each of the years 11-19 are assumed to be 
refinanced at the end of year 20.  
21. The rate of default, refinance, and extension are calculated based on the 
original mortgage amount. The sum of default, refinance, and 
extension is equal to the extension rate in the previous year.  
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Appendix  
Exhibit 1: Summary Statistics of Quarterly Commercial Loan 
Characteristics (1966:1-1998:3) 
 
Source: American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI). 
 
Exhibit 2: Extension Risk Measured by Historical Data 
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Exhibit 3: Mortgage Default, Extension, and Refinancing 
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Exhibit 5: Cumulative Default Rates and Extension Probabilities (No 
Amortization) 
 
 
Exhibit 6: Extension Risk Under Various Underwriting Standards 
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Exhibit 7: Mortgage Default and Refinancing During Extension 
 
 
Exhibit 8: Expected Loss from Mortgage Extension* 
 
* The expected losses are stated as a percentage of the outstanding loan balance at 
maturity.  
** Discount rate risk premium over contemporaneous mortgage interest rate. 
 
 
 
